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POINT I.
PUNITIVE DAMAGES SHOULD BE ALLOWED
FOR A RECKLESS DISREGARD OF PUBLIC
SAFETY.
Rio Grande argues that punitive damages should not
be allowed

for a conscious disregard

of public

safety.

(Reply Brief of Rio Grande, at P. 23.)
Older cases required malice-in-fact in order to
support a claim for punitive damages.

The more modern view

is that malice-in-law will support a claim for punitive
damages.

See e.g., Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc., 657

P.2d 267 (Utah 1983) .
It is often held that recklessness is a component
of malice-in-law:
Utah . . . A defendant's conduct must be
malicious or in reckless disregard for
the rights of others, although actual
intent to cause injury is not necessary.
Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp. Inc., 675
P.2d 1179, 1186 (Utah 1983).
Colorado . . . the injury complained of is
attended by circumstances of fraud,
malice or insult, or a wanton and
reckless
disregard
of
the
injured
party's rights and feelings. Colo.
Rev. Stat., § 13-21-102 (1973).

1

Connecticut . . . when the evidence shows a
reckless indifference to the rights of
others or is an intentional and wanton
violation of those rights. Collens v.
New Cannan Water Co., 155 Conn. 477,
234 A.2d 825, 832 (1967).
District of Columbia . . . for outrageous
conduct
such
as
maliciousness,
wantonness, gross fraud, recklessness,
and willful disregard of anotherfs
rights. Riggs Nat. Bank v. Price, 359
A.2d 25, 28 (D.C. App. 1976).
Hawaii . . . for willful, maliciousness,
wanton or aggravated wrongs where a
defendant has acted with a reckless
indifference to the rights of another.
Goo v. Continental Cas. Co., 52 Haw.
235, 473 P.2d 563, 566 (1970).
Iowa . . . in a reckless, wanton and grossly
negligent manner in total disregard for
the safety of workmen. Croxen v. U.S.
Chemical Corp. of W i s e , 558 F.Supp. 6
(N.D. Iowa 1982)
Missouri . . . There must be, in order to
justify punitive damages, some element
of wantonness or bad motive, but if one
intentionally does a wrongful act and
knows at the time that it is wrongful,
he does it wantonly and with a bad
motive . . . .
Furthermore, an evil
intent may be implied from reckless
disregard
of
another's
rights
and
interests.
Amish
v. Walnut Creek
Development, Inc., 631 S.W.2d 866 (Mo.
App. 1982).

2

New Mexico . . . when the conduct of the
wrongdoer may be said to be maliciously
intentional, fraudulent, oppressive, or
committed recklessly or with a wanton
disregard of the plaintiff's rights.
Loucks v. Albuquerque Nat. Bank, 76 N.M.
735, 418 P.2d 191 (1966) .
New York . . . based upon tortious acts which
involve ingredients of malice, fraud,
oppression, insult, wanton or reckless
disregard of the plaintiff's rights, or
other circumstances of aggravation. Le
Mistral, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting
System, 61 App. Div.2d 491, 402 N.Y.S.2d
815, 817 (1978) .
Ohio . . . caused by intentional, reckless,
wanton, wilful[sic] and gross acts or by
malice inferred conduct and surrounding
circumstances. Rubeck v. Huffman, 54
Ohio St.2d 20, 374 N.E.2d 411, 413
(1978) .
Rhode Island . . . upon evidence of such
willfulness, recklessness or wickedness,
on the part of the party at fault, as
amounted to criminality.
Sherman v.
McDermott, 114 R.I. 1107, 329 A.2d 195,
196 (1974).
South Carolina . . . must be malice, ill
will, a conscious indifference to the
rights
of
others, or
a
reckless
disregard thereof.
King v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 272 S.C. 259, 251 S.E.2d 194,
196 (1979).
Virginia . . . only where there is misconduct
or actual malice, or such recklessness
or negligence as to evince, a conscious
disregard of the rights of others.
Jordan v. Sauve, 219 Va. 448, 247 S.E.2d
739, 741 (1978) .

3

Wyoming . . . legal malice has been defined
as
'wrongful
or
illegal
conduct
committed or continued with a willful or
reckless disregard of another's rights,f
Sears v. Summit, Inc., 616 P.2d at 765,
770 (Wyo. 1980).

POINT II,
THERE IS EVIDENCE
FROM WHICH A JURY
THAT RIO GRANDE
LESS DISREGARD OF

IN THE RECORD
COULD CONCLUDE
ACTED IN RECKPUBLIC SAFETY.

Rio Grande argues that there was nothing reckless
about installing a stop sign.
However, Rio Grande misunderstands the argument.
Gleave does not seek punitive damages simply because Rio
Grande installed a stop sign.

Rather, Gleave seeks punitive

damages because Rio Grande left that temporary stop sign in
place for over ten years.
Grande

knew

that

temporary use.

the

sign was

only

intended

for

Indeed, Rio Grande had full knowledge that

long-term use of such
danger.

stop

During that entire decade Rio

stop

signs would

cause

increased

(See Point VII A, Gleavefs opening brief.)
Furthermore, Rio Grande took no safety precautions

other than placing the stop sign.

Specifically, Rio Grande

did not burn off the weeds that obstructed vision.
Rio Grande slow the speed of its trains.

Nor did

Indeed, Rio Grande

had no rules or regulations at all to protect motorists at

4

railroad crossings.

Finally, Rio Grande has never installed

the red flashing lights that were recommended in 1974.
(See Point VII B, Gleave's opening brief.)
We have noted, above, that Rio Grande took no
steps to improve safety at the crossing in over a decade.
The failure to act was not based on any misunderstanding.
The

failure

interest.

to act was based upon pure

financial self

Rio Grande's reply brief contains an interesting

comment:
. . . Rio Grande's desire to have a
stop sign at the subject crossing made
sense as a temporary measure (i.e. until
UDOT obtained federal funds to install
active signals).
Reply Brief of Rio Grande,
at p.22.
Thus, Rio Grande simply didn't want to incur the
expense of installing the red flashing light.

Rather, Rio

Grande wanted to wait for the State of Utah to install the
light.

In turn, the State of Utah didn't want to incur the

expense of a red flashing light.

The State of Utah waited

for the federal government to pay for the red flashing

—
Rio Grande argues that it had no power to install such
flashing lights without approval of the State of Utah.
However, that argument still doesn't get Rio Grande off the
hook. Here, there is no evidence that Rio Grande requested
any approval from the State of Utah to permit Rio Grande to
install a red flashing light at Rio Grande's expense. Nor
is there any evidence that Rio Grande requested the State of
Utah to install a red flashing light at the State of Utah's
expense.
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light.

Thus,

everyone

knew

of

the

danger.

However,

everyone waited—hoping that someone else would pay.

In the

meantime, Gleave was squashed like a bug.
In summary, Rio Grande knew of the grave danger.
However, Rio Grande did almost nothing at all.

The only

thing Rio Grande did was to install a stop sign which simply
made matters worse.

A jury could conclude, on these facts,

that Rio Grande acted in reckless disregard for the public
safety.
POINT III.
THE PREJUDGMENT INTEREST
STATUTES SHOULD BE BROADLY
CONSTRUED TO LESSEN COURT
DELAYS.
Rio

Grande's

brief

argues

(See p. 20 of grey cover brief.)

legislative

intent.

However, Rio Grande has

failed to recognize the true legislative intent.
In a perfect world, an injured party would have
his day in court immediately after an accident.
our world is flawed.

However,

An injured person must wait a year—or

two—or three to get that date in court—then he must wait
another year or two for an appeal.
The only issue is who gets the benefit of that
court delay.
of a case

It is not uncommon for the ultimate resolution
(including appeal) to take up to six years.
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During that six years, a wrongdoer could save enough on
interest to pay the entire judgment.

Thus, wrongdoers (and

defense law firms) have a powerful motive to delay and clog
the courts.
The legislature has given the courts a tool to
attack that evil.

The tool is § 78-27-44, Utah Code Ann. .

This Court should construe the statute broadly to make full
use of that tool.
POINT IV.
THE COURT SHOULD NOT LUMP
ALL ISSUES TOGETHER FOR
REMAND.
It is likely that the case must be remanded on
some

issues.

There

might

be

an

issue

between Rio Grande and the State of Utah.

of

contribution

Also, the Court

might reinstate the issue of punitive damages.
Thus, the question will arise whether to affirm in
part and remand some issues; or whether to lump everything
together and remand on all issues.
In that regard, Gleave urges the Court to remember
the

ancient

denied."

Latin

maxim,

"justice

delayed

is

Gleave was injured over three years ago.

then, he has not been able to work.

justice
Since

He has paid thousands

and thousands of dollars for experts and other costs at the
first trial.
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If
together—so

it
be

is
it.

hardship to Gleave.

necessary

to

re-try

However, that pathway

all
is

issues
a great

Thus, we urge the Court, if at all

possible, not to lump all issues together.

Rather, we urge

the Court to sever and affirm the issue of liability and
compensatory damages.

The remaining issues can be remanded

for further proceedings.
Respectfully

submitted

this

day

of

, 1985.
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Respondent
and Cross-Appellant
Robert L. Gleave
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